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THE MYTH OF THE RELIABILITY TEST
Brandon L. Garrett* & M. Chris Fabricant**
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and subsequent revisions to Federal Rule of Evidence
702, was supposed to usher a reliability revolution. This modern test for
admissibility of expert evidence is sometimes described as a reliability test.
Critics, however, have pointed out that judges continue to routinely admit
unreliable evidence, particularly in criminal cases, including flawed forensic
techniques that have contributed to convictions of innocent people later
exonerated by DNA testing. This Article examines whether Rule 702 is in
fact functioning as a reliability test, focusing on forensic evidence used in
criminal cases and detailing the use of that test in states that have adopted
the language of the 2000 revisions to Rule 702. Surveying hundreds of state
court cases, we find that courts have largely neglected the critical language
concerning reliability in the Rule. Rule 702 states that an expert may testify
if that testimony is “the product of reliable principles and methods,” which
are “reliably applied” to the facts of a case. Or as the Advisory Committee
puts it simply, judges are charged to “exclude unreliable expert testimony.”
Judges have not done so in state or federal courts, and in this study, we detail
how that has occurred, focusing on criminal cases, where the vast majority
of criminal cases are brought in state and not federal court.
We assembled a collection of 229 state criminal cases that quote and in
some minimal fashion discuss the reliability requirement. This archive will
hopefully be of use to litigators and evidence scholars. We find, however,
that in the unusual cases in which state courts discuss reliability under Rule
702 they invariably admit the evidence, largely by citing to precedent and
qualifications of the expert or by acknowledging but not acting upon the
reliability concern. In short, the supposed reliability test adopted in Rule 702
is rarely applied to assess reliability. We call on judges do far more to ensure
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reliability of expert evidence and recommend sharper Rule 702 requirements.
We emphasize, though, that it is judicial inaction and not the language of
Rule 702 that has made the reliability test a myth.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 and subsequent revisions to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, was intended to usher in a reliability revolution, requiring
judges to act as “gatekeepers” to exclude expert testimony lacking sufficient
indicia of scientific validity.2 This modern approach to expert evidence
frequently used in both civil and criminal cases is often summarized as a
“reliability test.”3 In this Article, we examine whether it is in fact functioning
as a reliability test, focusing on forensic evidence used in state criminal cases.
We detail the use of that reliability test in states that have adopted the
language of the 2000 revisions to Rule 702, collecting all opinions that cite
to it.4 We find that even in rulings that do cite to Rule 702, state courts have
neglected the critical language concerning reliability in the Rule and have
instead reflexively cited precedent and the putative “flexibility” of the Rule
to justify the admission of forensic evidence.
Rule 702 states that an expert may testify if that testimony is “the product
of reliable principles and methods,” which are “reliably applied” to the facts
of a case.5 Or as the Advisory Committee puts it simply, judges are charged
to “exclude unreliable expert testimony.”6 Legal and scientific observers

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments.
3. See, e.g., Jessica G. Cino, An Uncivil Action: Criminalizing Daubert in Procedure
and Practice to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 651, 655 (2016) (suggesting
that Daubert fashioned “a new reliability test”).
4. See infra Appendix I.
5. FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d).
6. Id. r. advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments.
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have noted that judges have largely not done so in state or federal courts.7 In
this study, we detail how that has occurred in the larger body of state court
rulings, where most criminal cases are brought. We find that the reliability
test in Rule 702 has largely been ignored. More clear and prescriptive
language or direct regulation may be needed to address the laissez-faire
nonregulation of scientific evidence in criminal cases.8
Legal and scientific scholars have much lamented the failure of modern
scientific-evidence standards to address, much less remedy, the introduction
of unreliable forensic evidence, including techniques that have been
implicated in wrongful convictions.9 The use of invalid and unreliable
forensic science has been documented in large numbers of cases later shown
by postconviction DNA tests to have been wrongful convictions of innocent
defendants.10 One of us has detailed the role that forensics played in those
exonerations.11 The scientific community has repeatedly issued authoritative
reports finding that unreliable and unscientific evidence nevertheless
continues to be routinely admittedincluding evidence so unreliable that it
is not “foundationally valid.”12 Scholars have been concerned that courts
simply admit evidence based on precedent.13 Many evidence scholars have
argued that first Daubert and then the revisions to Rule 702 in 2000 have not
been evenhandedly applied in civil and criminal cases, even following
adoption of new evidentiary standards.14 They have observed how judges tilt
7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 95–97 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ].
8. The term “scientific” raises the question of what types of expertise should be included
in the concept of “science.” We generally discuss in this Article expert evidence used in
criminal cases. We do not attempt to draw the distinction between scientific and technical
expertise, and while the Supreme Court has raised in rulings like Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that not all forms of expertise have the same scientific
underpinnings, id. at 147–49, courts have similarly not drawn firm lines between scientific
and technical expertise. Instead, the rules and court rulings highlight how concepts like
reliability matter regardless of how one characterizes the expertise, whether technical or
scientific.
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 42; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J.
Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892,
894–95 (2005).
10. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
11. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION (Daniel Medwed ed., 2017); Garrett &
Neufeld, supra note 10.
12. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7–14 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R76Y-7VU] (finding that bite-mark comparison evidence, shoeprint
evidence, and firearms evidence are not foundationally valid).
13. See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1195–97 (2004).
14. See generally Cino, supra note 3; Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal
Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381 (2007); Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme
Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003); Peter J. Neufeld,
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toward the prosecution to allow unreliable or unvalidated evidence in
criminal cases and that judges may more carefully scrutinize evidence when
the defense seeks to offer expert testimony.15 This has also been observed in
civil cases, in which there may more commonly be a “battle of the experts”
between both sides.16 Empirical study of judicial opinions on scientific
evidence tends to confirm that concern.17
A paradigmatic example of this lax approach in criminal cases is the
anomalous jurisprudence associated with bite-mark evidence, a largely
discredited forensic technique.18 In dismissing a civil rights suit brought by
a man whose wrongful conviction was obtained largely through the
introduction of bite-mark evidence, a federal court cited the technique’s
“[s]ixty-three percent!” error rate and found it “doubtful that ‘expert’ bite
mark analysis would pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in a
case tried in federal court,” because Rule 702(c) requires that “expert
testimony be ‘the product of reliable principles and methods.’”19
In light of the data cited by this civil court, its findings are perhaps to be
anticipated. Yet just four months later, a criminal court in Florida admitted
bite-mark evidence under that state’s version of Rule 702,20 which was
adopted in 2013 and mirrors the federal rule.21 That court simply recounted
the expert’s credentials, described the assay’s methodology and concluded
that the proffered bite-mark testimony was the product of reliable
principles.22 The lack of a statistical database to support the proposed
testimony and the “limited studies” establishing an error rate were, according
to the court, irrelevant—including the study finding error rates as high as 63
percent—because bite-mark evidence “is a comparison-based science
and . . . the lack of such studies or databases is not an accurate indicator of
its reliability.”23 Finally, the court undertook what amounted to a Frye

The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005).
15. See supra note 14.
16. See supra note 14.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 12, at 87 (finding that
“bitemark analysis does not meet the scientific standards for foundational validity, and is far
from meeting such standards”); Michael J. Saks et al., Forensic Bitemark Identification: Weak
Foundations, Exaggerated Claims, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 538, 543–46 (2016); M. Chris
Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s Overdue Evolution
from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 38 (2016) (“Perhaps no discredited forensic assay has
benefited more from criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper responsibilities than bite mark
analysis.”).
19. Starks v. City of Waukegan, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1051–52 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (quoting
FED. R. EVID. 702(c)).
20. State v. O’Connell, No. 10-CF-12600-B, 2015 WL 10384608, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
30, 2015).
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 2013).
22. O’Connell, 2015 WL 10384608, at *3.
23. Id. at *5 (“[B]ecause bite mark analysis is based partly on experience and training, the
hard science methods of validation, such as assessing the potential rate of error, are not always
appropriate for testing its reliability.” (quoting Coronado v. State, 384 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012))). The court found the absence of a valid error rate irrelevant to its
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analysis, concluding that “bite mark identification or analysis has been
accepted in Florida courts as early as 1984, and has been found to be
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community in other
jurisdictions.”24
For a more rigorous use of the modern reliability rule, a recent North
Carolina appellate ruling in State v. McPhaul25 can be contrasted with the
ruling in Florida. The prosecution had introduced latent fingerprint
comparison testimony at trial, and the expert testified that prints found at the
crime scene matched the defendant’s known prints.26 The appellate court
highlighted that in 2011 the legislature had amended Rule 702 to adopt the
“federal standard,” which required that expert testimony “applied” principles
and methods “reliably” in a case.27 When the expert testified about how she
reached conclusions in the case, she could only say that she did so based on
her “training and experience.”28 The appellate court emphasized that she
provided no “detail in testifying how she arrived at her actual conclusions in
this case.”29 As a result, the panel held that it was error to admit the
testimony since there was no evidence that the methods and principles were
reliably applied.30
Rulings like the McPhaul opinion are especially rare considering the
evidence was proffered by the prosecution, as we will detail. Yet the
adoption of Rule 702 in 2000 could have been expected to increase the focus
of courts on the admissibility of expert evidence. We focus here on state
courts, where the vast bulk of criminal cases are brought in state and not
federal court. In state courts adopting the text of that rule, one might have
expected to observe a change in focus to address questions of reliability more
carefully. In this Article, we examine state court rulings in criminal cases
regarding the two reliability prongs of Rule 702(c), which requires that expert
evidence be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and Rule
702(d), which asks that those principles and methods be “reliably applied” to
the facts of the case. Thus, we did not identify or examine cases that did not
result in a written opinion or cite to Rule 702 or its state equivalent.
admissibility determination in Coronado; while the O’Connell court, citing Coronado, found
a potential 63 percent error rate irrelevant to its Daubert ruling. Id. at *5 & n.3.
24. Id. (relying on the standard set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), in which the admissibility of a novel form of expertise is assessed based on its
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community). It is worth noting that the court’s
Frye analysis was also flawed because it defined the “relevant scientific community” as
limited to bite-mark experts themselves. Compare id. at *1, *4 (assessing the reliability of a
forensic odontologist based on the “techniques, materials, and methodology” of a forensic
odontology standards and certification board), with State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644
P.2d 1266, 1285 (Ariz. 1982) (“This [general acceptance] requirement is not satisfied with
testimony from a single expert or group of experts who personally believe the challenged
procedure is accepted or is reliable.”).
25. No. COA16-924, 2017 WL 5145969 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).
26. Id. at *8.
27. Id. at *7.
28. Id. at *8.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *9–10 (finding the error to be harmless given other evidence in the case tying
the defendant to the crime scene).
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Of the more than 850 cases identified that referred to reliability standards
in their text, we identified 229 cases that quoted Rule 702 and then in some
minimal fashion discussed one of its two reliability prongs. In Appendix I,
we supply this archive of state court rulings. This archive should prove a
useful resource for litigators and scholars seeking case law that discusses
reliability across a host of forensic disciplines—from ballistics, to fingerprint
comparisons, to cell-tower location, to drug analysis.
Very few of those rulings, however, discussed the term “reliability” in any
meaningful way, much less the two ways in which Rule 702 sets out
reliability requirements. State judges rarely addressed error rates or the
consistency of forensic techniques between examiners or even consistency
by the same examiner over time. They chiefly ruled that the evidence should
be admissible based on prior rulings admitting that type of evidence, the
qualifications of the expert, and supposed general acceptance in the field
(typically without carefully engaging with questions concerning which field
is the relevant one).31 The few exceptions in which the reliability prongs of
Rule 702 were more rigorously applied were largely in rulings excluding
defense experts; thirty-four cases were rulings affirming the exclusion of
such experts, while sixteen cases ruled that prosecution witnesses should
have been excluded.
Unfortunately, these findings are not surprising. They track what had been
observed in federal rulings on expert evidence in the years following
Daubert’s adoption. We discuss each of the federal appellate cases
evaluating fingerprint evidence and its admissibility, and none of those panel
rulings discuss the requirements of the post-2000 Rule 702. As the bulk of
criminal cases occur in state and not federal courts, this suggests that some
new intervention is needed. The language of Rule 702 is not the sole
problem—after all, that language squarely addresses reliability, both of
methods and their application to the facts. That reliability language,
however, has largely been ignored by state and federal judges. More forceful
language might make the importance of assessing reliability more salient to
judges, perhaps with more detailed accompanying guidance in Advisory
Committee notes.
We suggest that Rule 702 can and should be improved by, for example,
clarifying that precedent cannot serve as a proxy for reliability and that the
threshold standard for expert qualification should be based on the objective
proficiency of an expert. Future efforts, however, must go far beyond the
text of the rule. Regulation of expert reliability and proficiency may be more
important. While such legislation and regulation exists in the area of clinical
laboratories, efforts to enact such legislation have largely stalled at the federal
level. Some states have done more to examine and regulate the reliability of
forensics, but such efforts have also been slow and idiosyncratic. A
31. Other articles in this Symposium address that issue carefully, including Karen
Kafadar’s piece describing the importance of statistical methods to forensics and the errors
that can result when statistical expertise is not relied upon. See generally Karen Kafadar, The
Critical Role of Statistics in Demonstrating the Reliability of Expert Evidence, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1617 (2018).
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recognition that Rule 702 is not working as intended in criminal cases might
add some impetus to such nascent efforts and national applicability.
In Part I describes the Daubert ruling and its focus on reliability. It then
analyzes the 2000 revisions to Rule 702 and the reliability language adopted
in those revisions. Next, Part II presents an overview of the study findings
and an analysis of the state court decisions that discuss state reliability rules
in decisions regarding admissibility of expert evidence in criminal cases. Part
III goes on to discuss the implications of these findings. It concludes that the
supposed reliability test is largely not used to test reliability in criminal cases.
This raises an enormous challenge because the language of the rule is quite
clear. It could be strengthened, but the larger problem seems to lie with
judicial attitudes and approaches—not the text of the rule. We discuss
possible reforms to encourage better use of expert evidence in criminal cases,
which others have long advanced. We hope, however, that these empirical
and qualitative findings help to show how the problem at both the state and
federal levels requires urgent attention.
I. THE RELIABILITY TEST
A. Daubert and Reliability
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert transformed the adjudication of
expert evidence in federal and also many state courts that adopted the same
approach by focusing the inquiry on questions of the reliability and validity
of the expert’s methodology and conclusions.32 The Daubert approach is
often summarized as a “reliability test” for expert evidence. What did the
opinion actually say about reliability? The Daubert Court stated that “the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”33 What does reliable mean? The
Court noted that the rules assume that “the expert’s opinion will have a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.”34 The
Court also noted that “scientists typically distinguish between ‘validity’ (does
the principle support what it purports to show?) and ‘reliability’ (does
application of the principle produce consistent results?).”35 The Court stated
that its emphasis on reliability in a case involving scientific evidence “will
be based upon scientific validity.”36
Apparently, then, the focus is on whether the principles relied upon support
what they purport to show and not on consistency of results. However, the
Court separately discussed the need for a known or potential error rate and
standards for the use of the technique, which relate to consistency of results
or reliability.37 Thus, reliability and validity seem to be a part of the inquiry
32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (noting that the
helpfulness consideration “has been aptly described . . . as one of ‘fit’”).
33. Id. at 589.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id. at 590 n.9.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 594.
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called for by Daubert. The reality is somewhat more nuanced. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court has since described the resulting “exacting
standards of reliability.”38 On the other hand, the Court has described the
Daubert inquiry as “a flexible one.”39 Federal trial courts have “considerable
leeway” in determining “how to test an expert’s reliability.”40 And, “the
relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or
experience.”41
B. Rule 702 and Reliability
In 2000, Rule 702 was amended to reflect the changes announced in
Daubert and to make additional changes to the handling of expert evidence.42
Rule 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as an expert may testify if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.43

Our focus is on subsections (c) and (d), which both focus on “reliability.”
What does reliability mean in those sections? The Rule clearly calls for a
higher level of scrutiny of the reliability of expert testimony than would be
required under a Rule 403 analysis of the reliability of any type of evidence.44
Rule 702 directs courts to assess reliability in the two specific ways noted
and as part of a threshold inquiry. The text of the Rule focuses on both the
reliability of the principles and methods used by the putative expert and on
the manner in which the expert applied those principles and methods to the
facts of the case. Both are important. A method can be sound, but the expert
can extrapolate a method beyond its validated application or apply that
method to unsuitable facts or in an unsuitable manner. A method can be
reliable when applied carefully, but highly inconsistent or inaccurate in its
results if it is applied poorly by a given expert. Rule 702 clearly calls on a
judge to scrutinize reliability both at the level of methods used and
application in a given case.
38. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
39. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 594).
40. Id. at 152.
41. Id. at 150.
42. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EVIDENCE RULES 5–8 (1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV051999.pdf [https://perma.cc/V79Z-ZL2Z].
43. FED. R. EVID. 702.
44. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 precludes the introduction of “relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. r. 403.
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The Advisory Committee notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 shed
little further light on what is meant by “reliability,” although they do refer to
the term. The notes state, “If the expert purports to apply principles and
methods to the facts of the case, it is important that this application be
conducted reliably.”45 Both the notes and the way that reliability is discussed
in the Rule suggest that scientific concepts of validity and reliability, as noted
in Daubert, are relevant. They are both concerned with whether the
technique does what it purports to and whether it can produce consistent
results as applied.
To be sure, the Committee also noted that the Rule 702 “amendment is not
intended to . . . preclude the testimony of experience-based experts.”46 The
notes also emphasize, however, “An opinion from an expert who is not a
scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for reliability as an
opinion from an expert who purports to be a scientist.”47 The notes also state,
“In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great
deal of reliable expert testimony.”48 Importantly, the expert must also be able
to show “how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”49 The
Committee also stated that “[t]he evidentiary requirement of reliability is
lower than the merits standard of correctness” since experts can reach
different conclusions, including because they rely on different facts. That
experts might do so does not necessarily bar their testimony.50
C. Expert Reliability in Federal Courts
Studies of the use of Daubert and Rule 702 have found a marked tilt toward
civil litigation in the use of that expert gatekeeping standard. Early studies
showed that the bulk of federal cases citing to Daubert were in civil, not

45. Id. r. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of
discretion in admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical
experience and extensive training and who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v.
Sears Roebuck, 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996) (admitting a design engineer’s
testimony when the expert’s opinions “are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and
traditional technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the
information and procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches”)); see also Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999) (stating that “no one denies that an expert might
draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience”).
49. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments. For criticism of
the notes’ treatment of experience and the failure to recognize that experience can be assessed
using proficiency tests to measure the reliability of subjective expertise, see Brandon L. Garrett
& Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
50. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (quoting Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth. v. Brown (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.), 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The Advisory Committee further explained that:
[w]hen facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach different conclusions based on
competing versions of the facts. The emphasis in the amendment on “sufficient facts
or data” is not intended to authorize a trial court to exclude an expert’s testimony on
the ground that the court believes one version of the facts and not the other.
Id.
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criminal, cases.51 A study by Peter Neufeld noted that in the seven years after
Daubert, there were just 211 reported challenges to the admissibility of
prosecution expert evidence.52 During that time there were sixty-seven
reported federal appellate decisions, and the government prevailed in all but
six, with only one resulting in a reversed conviction.53 Neufeld called
Daubert largely “irrelevant” to criminal justice.54 Some scholars, focusing
on both civil and criminal cases, have observed that Daubert did not change
the practice in federal or state courts, while others have found a qualitative
difference and a measurably stricter analysis in civil cases in state and federal
courts.55
One study has also suggested that judges do not carefully apply factors in
Daubert but rather look at more general features of testimony like the
credentials of the expert, prior rulings admitting that type of evidence, and
general acceptance by others in the field.56
The reliability language in Rule 702, which is our focus in this Article, is
widely perceived to have been neglected by federal judges. While, as noted,
there is an empirical debate whether Daubert and then Rule 702 made judicial
review of admissibility of expert evidence more strict in practice, there is
evidence that judges do not focus their review on the reliability inquiry.57
For example, a 2014 Ninth Circuit ruling held that the reliability of principles
and methods should be assessed but that the question whether they were
reliably applied to the facts of the case could be left for the jury to decide.58
As David Bernstein and Eric Lasker describe, “this is far from the only circuit
court opinion to ignore amended Rule 702 in favor of more lenient
admissibility standards” because federal appellate courts often cite and rely
on Daubert or even pre-Daubert standards rather than the text of Rule 702.59

51. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 104–05 (2000).
52. Neufeld, supra note 14, at S110.
53. Id. at S109.
54. Id. at S107.
55. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter?: A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (finding that “a state’s
adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in practice”); see also DAVID H. KAYE ET
AL., THE NEW WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 6.3.2 (2d ed. 2010). But see
LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE
IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION, at xv (2001) (analyzing federal district
court opinions and finding support for “stricter standards”); Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The
Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil Defendants, 62
CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 680–81 (2013) (finding evidence, based on changes in removal rates
from state to federal court depending on state court adoption of Daubert standards, that civil
litigants view Daubert as more restrictive).
56. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 344–46,
352, 358 (2002).
57. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell
Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 126–37 (2005).
58. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014).
59. David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015); see also David E. Bernstein,
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On the reliability prongs of Rule 702 specifically, as Victor Gold has put
it, “when lower courts are confronted with expert testimony in disciplines
outside of science, they follow Daubert but struggle to identify concrete
factors indicative of reliability in the specific area of expertise at issue.”60
One reason why, according to Gold, is that “[r]eliability is not exactly the
same thing as trustworthiness, but it’s a broad concept.”61
In criminal cases, this has been particularly true. One example is in the
area of latent fingerprint testimony. Of the federal appellate courts to have
discussed the question whether fingerprint testimony is admissible, none
have actually addressed the question of reliability under Rule 702 by
claiming to apply the requirements of Rule 702(c) and (d). All of the federal
courts of appeals except the Second Circuit have considered whether
fingerprint identifications should be admissible, and all but a Ninth Circuit
ruling occurred after the 2000 revisions to Rule 702.62 Yet those rulings do
The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27,
35–40 (2013).
60. Victor Gold, The Three Commandments of Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1622 (2017).
61. Conference on Possible Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 807, and
801(D)(1)(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1552 (2017).
62. See United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that Rule 702
governs but not quoting or discussing any of the requirements of the rule and stating that the
admissibility of fingerprint evidence was “properly taken for granted” (quoting Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999))); United States v. Watkins, 450 F. App’x 511,
515–16 (6th Cir. 2011) (failing to discuss the requirements of Rule 702 and noting that, despite
the expert’s “mistaken” claim that there is no error rate in fingerprinting, the error rate is just
one of several factors to be considered and further noting that examiner testified regarding
“the system of proficiency testing within her lab” at the Daubert hearing); United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 263, 275 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the error rate is low” and without
discussing the requirements of Rule 702 and stating that no Daubert or Rule 702 hearing was
required for fingerprint evidence); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989–92 (10th Cir.
2009) (finding that reliable identifications may be made and citing to the manner in which law
enforcement agencies have “extensively” used fingerprint evidence for “almost a century” but
not discussing the requirements of Rule 702); United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663
(8th Cir. 2008) (failing to discuss the requirements of Rule 702 but noting that fingerprint
evidence has been recognized by other courts as “generally accepted” (quoting United States
v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003))); United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 264–
66 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing, in an immigration case, the requirements of Rule 702 but
finding that the defendant did not sufficiently preserve reliability-related objections at trial and
finding no error regardless because the defendant asked questions relating to reliability of the
method during the trial); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2005)
(stating that “[w]e agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint
evidence admitted in this case satisfied Daubert” and quoting the text of Rule 702 but failing
to discuss or analyze the requirements of Rule 702); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690
(8th Cir. 2004) (calling fingerprint evidence generally accepted and finding that the defendant
did not sufficiently preserve the question of the evidence’s reliability); United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 238–46 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the adoption of the 2000
amendments to Rule 702 but not quoting or analyzing its text or requirements, instead
discussing reliability generally under Daubert and rejecting defense evidence that raised
objections regarding the admissibility of fingerprint testimony, including a concerning over
error rates); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding fingerprint
testimony admissible and noting the view that fingerprinting has a “low rate of error” without
discussing the requirements of Rule 702 in any detail); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261,
269–73 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that Rule 702 applies but not quoting or discussing its text or
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not claim to apply the Rule 702 “reliability” language; most do not even quote
the text of the Rule. They instead largely discuss the factors set out in
Daubert rather than the requirements set out in Rule 702. In doing so, they
typically do not conduct any meaningful analysis of reliability of fingerprint
evidence. Several courts discuss error rates in a limited way, noting that the
error rate is “low” or crediting the experience of the fingerprint examiner and
the description of the methods used as reliable ones, even in the absence of
data to support that assertion.63 These courts have largely sidestepped
questions regarding reliability of the method and reliability as applied under
Rule 702(c) and (d). These courts of appeals instead say that whatever the
error rate is, it must be low; they may discuss the experience of the particular
examiner; and they emphasize that fingerprint evidence has long been
“generally accepted.”64
For example, in one of the more detailed among these opinions—the Tenth
Circuit’s 2009 ruling in United States v. Baines65—the panel emphasized that
fingerprinting is “reliable” not based on scientific studies, which have
documented error rates, but based on a century of common use by law
enforcement.66 Thus, although the panel mentioned error rates and
reliability, it actually conducted what amounted to a Frye “general
acceptance” analysis. Since the defendant raised the understandable concern
that not only was Frye displaced by Daubert but also that a rote analysis of
factors under Daubert is not the proper analysis post-2000 amendments to
Rule 702, the panel acknowledged that it “need not either accept or reject this
contention.”67 Without conducting a Rule 702 analysis, the panel simply
noted that the Rule 702 analysis is “a flexible one.”68
Or take the Third Circuit ruling in United States v. Mitchell,69 in which the
panel acknowledged a lack of testing of the reliability of fingerprint
testimony. The panel instead relied on a “long history of implicit testing”—
in which fingerprint experts have conducted analysis in their casework and
reliability requirements, citing to a long history of admissibility and the expert community’s
claim of a very low error rate, and noting that “[i]n sum, the district court heard testimony to
the effect that the expert community has consistently vouched for the reliability of the
fingerprinting identification technique over the course of decades”); United States v.
Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding, in a pre-2000 amendments case, that
fingerprint testimony is generally accepted). In George, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its prior
ruling in United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). See George, 363 F.3d at 672.
In Havvard, the court noted that Rule 702 applied but did not quote its text or discuss its
requirements. See Havvard, 260 F.3d at 599–600. Instead, the court quoted Daubert and
Kumho Tire and concluded that the known “error rate” factor was satisfied because the expert
testified that the error rate for fingerprint comparison was “essentially zero.” Id.
63. See supra note 62.
64. Baines, 573 F.3d at 991–92. See generally supra note 62. At the same time, courts
have precluded questioning examiners on known misidentifications in latent fingerprint cases.
See United States v. Bonds, No. 15 CR 573-2, 2017 WL 4511061, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10,
2017).
65. 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009).
66. Id. at 989–90.
67. Id. at 991–92.
68. Id. at 992.
69. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
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not reported making errors—and on evidence that the error rate they report
is “very low.”70 In effect, that panel substituted experience, as self-reported
by fingerprint examiners, for reliability. At the same time, the panel claimed
that in its analysis “[r]eliability remains the polestar.”71 In a dissent, one
Fourth Circuit judge explained that there was simply no evidence of
reliability: “The government did not offer any record of testing on the
reliability of fingerprint identification” and “[t]he history of fingerprint
identification and the dogged certainty of its examiners are insufficient to
show that the technique is reliable.”72 Such rulings, even in dissent, are
vanishingly rare in federal courts. The majority opinion in that case, like in
the other circuits, did not discuss the requirements of Rule 702 and instead
emphasized how fingerprint evidence has “a long history of admissibility in
the courts of this country” and credited the expert community’s claim that
there was an “essentially zero” error rate in the field.73
Thus, as critics have described, federal courts avoid conducting any
substantive discussion of the reliability language in Rule 702. Instead, the
analysis resembles a cursory Frye analysis rather than a Daubert analysis or
the analysis actually required by Rule 702.
II. EXPERT RELIABILITY IN STATE COURTS
We conducted a study to assess whether state courts have engaged more
meaningfully with the reliability requirements in Rule 702 in criminal cases
since many states have adopted the language of the 2000 revisions of Rule
702. As this Part describes, the federal appellate rulings concerning
fingerprint evidence mirror the entire body of state court rulings that
commonly do not discuss Rule 702 at all, much less its reliability language,
and discuss reliability if at all only in a very general way, without engaging
with the specific requirements of Rule 702. While state courts do at times
cite to the language of Rule 702, they often at most then recite Daubert
factors regarding reliability without explaining what reliability means and
without demanding that experts demonstrate any type of reliability as
prescribed by the Rule. The courts instead largely rely on other judicial
opinions that have previously admitted the form of evidence, state that the
qualifications or expertise of the expert suffice as a proxy for reliability, or
find that defendants have not adequately preserved objections to reliability.
It is incredibly rare to find any discussion of reliability, except in one context:
when courts exclude defense experts.
A. Overview of Study Findings
We examine how state courts have used the reliability prongs of Rule 702
in criminal cases in the states that have adopted some version of the federal
Rule 702 or an equivalent with language regarding the reliability of the
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 238, 240–41.
Id. at 244.
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id. at 269, 271.
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proffered expert evidence. Those states, and the year that they adopted Rule
702 or an analogue that contains a reliability rule, are indicated in Appendix
II.74 Importantly, we could only examine published and nonsummary written
judicial decisions; thus, these data consisted entirely of appellate rulings.
Appellate rulings with non-summary decisions and on evidentiary questions
are not common in state courts. Moreover, we only examined decisions that
cited to Rule 702, and not rulings failing entirely to cite to the Rule.
For those reasons, the data cannot provide the full picture conveying what
state practice looks like. These data are limited to years in which states
adopted Rule 702. For some states, that includes far more years and more
time for the case law to develop than in others. We excluded cases not
applying the post-2000 version of Rule 702, except in states that had included
reliability-related language in their rule pre-2000. We examined criminal
rulings—not rulings on other constitutional or evidentiary claims. As a
result, we excluded cases that did not discuss reliability in any way but rather
relied on whether the expert testimony was relevant to disputed issues in the
case75 or whether the expert was properly qualified with sufficient education,
training, and experience.76 These searches were limited to state court rulings
in criminal cases since our focus is on forensic evidence. Rulings that quoted
the language from the state rule 702 but did not say anything about that
language were not included. We were looking for cases that said something
in their reasoning about the reliability requirements in Rule 702, even if it
was a summary statement that the expert evidence in question was reliable.
We identified over 850 cases that quoted either of the two Rule 702
reliability standards in their text or that were cited as discussing Rule 702’s
gatekeeping requirement. From those, we identified 229 cases that discussed
one of the two standards, including language concerning “reliable principles
and methods” and reliable application to the facts of the case. Appendix I
includes citations to each of those cases. We included rulings that, in
interpreting state rule 702 reliability requirements, applied the federal
Daubert standard. We did not include rulings that did not quote from state
rule 702 requirements. Nor did we include cases that applied Daubert but
not the state rule 702.77 To identify these cases, we conducted searches for
cases quoting the language from the relevant state rule 702 and KeyCite
searches. We had assistance from a research assistant and pro bono
74. See infra Appendix II. The following states have either not adopted an analogue to
Rule 702 or do not have rules of evidence: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
75. See, e.g., People v. Stafford, No. 332007, 2017 WL 3642652, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 2017).
76. While we excluded cases that relied on whether a person was properly qualified as an
expert, instead of applying a reliability standard, see generally State v. Farris, 210 So. 3d 877
(La. Ct. App. 2016); Gray v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.3d 253 (Ky. 2016), we included cases
in which the court stated that the expert testimony was reliable, and, in explaining the reason
why, simply referred to the expert’s training and experience, see People v. Lay, No. 330880,
2017 WL 3276845 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).
77. See generally State v. Johnson, 860 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 2015).
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associates at two law firms, all of whom conducted duplicative searches in
an effort to locate any cases that the others might have missed. While it is
certainly possible that we have still omitted cases, we hope that with so many
people assisting in reviewing these state court rulings that we have a good
collection of the rulings that exist on state expert-reliability standards.
Appendix II lists the number of these cases with a nonsummary discussion
of state rule 702 reliability elements.
The rulings were not concentrated in any set of forensic disciplines but
reflected a wide variety of disciplines and types of proffered expertise.78 For
example, the cases involved disciplines ranging from blood alcohol testing
(thirteen cases) to ballistics (seven cases), fingerprint comparisons (six cases)
to different forms of drug testing (seventeen cases), modern DNA testing
(sixteen cases) to firearms analysis (eight cases), and evidence concerning
false confessions (six cases) and eyewitness memory (six cases). A larger
grouping of fifty-three cases includes psychological testimony, which ranges
from syndrome evidence, child-abuse evidence, forensic interviewing, and
false-confession-related evidence. Those contain very different disciplines,
but it is noteworthy that within those cases, the defense was excluded six of
eleven times that the evidence was proffered in these cases. The prosecution
expert was excluded in only one case. As discussed below, such exclusions
are unlikely to be appealed, but they may also be far less likely to occur.
B. State Rule 702 Rulings
We then analyzed the content of these state court rulings that discussed the
reliability language in the relevant expert-admissibility rule. Much of the
legal reasoning in these opinions was brief and largely superficial in nature.
Many state courts hold that it is unnecessary to conduct a Rule 702 analysis
if the forensics are not novel, which is typically a component of a Frye
analysis, not a Rule 702 inquiry. For example, the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Oklahoma ruled in a shaken baby syndrome case that a trial court “has
discretion to avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings in ordinary cases
where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted, in
order to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay.”79 Many state courts did not
analyze the language of their rule in any detail but instead conducted a
Daubert analysis. Of the 229 rulings identified, 104 relied at least in part on
a Daubert analysis. Forty of the rulings stated that expert evidence satisfied
Rule 702 or Daubert because prior rulings had already approved of such
evidence.80 Many decisions quoted the text of their rule but did not do more
than summarily state that the relevant expert testimony was reliable; we
included such decisions in our analysis.81

78. See infra Appendix I.
79. Day v. State, 303 P.3d 291, 295 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013).
80. See, e.g., State v. Frye, No. COA16–362, 2016 WL 6440555, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App.
Nov. 1, 2016).
81. See, e.g., Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906, 908 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016).
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For example, we located only five rulings in Louisiana discussing
reliability in the context of Louisiana’s analogue to Rule 702, adopted in
2014. The first of those cases merely noted that reliability is a threshold
determination and then emphasized the “broad latitude” that judges have
when making reliability determinations.82 It then proceeded to recount the
credentials of the prosecution experts.83
The second such ruling repeated verbatim the same boilerplate language
concerning judges’ “broad latitude.”84 However, it then discussed the
defendant’s motion challenging admissibility of firearms testimony.85 The
motion, the court noted, cited to a National Research Council (NRC) report86
and the lengthy hearing that the trial judge had conducted, during which the
defense questioned the expert about his proficiency and about the reliability
of the method.87 The court discussed concerns that expert credentials and
experience are not sufficient.88 However, the court cited prior rulings in
Louisiana, all predating the adoption of the new Rule 702 analogue, and
concluded that “according to the jurisprudence of this State, testimony
regarding the witness’s background, qualifications, training, and
experience . . . supports the trial court’s ruling that [the analyst’s] testimony
was reliable per Daubert.”89 The court discussed evidence regarding error
rates and discussed federal rulings on similar evidence before concluding that
“even after publication of the [NRC] Report, courts have addressed, in detail,
the reliability of such testimony and ruled it admissible, although to varying
degrees of specificity.”90
A third opinion relied upon factors in Daubert, instead of the text of the
Rule 702 analogue, for its analysis.91 There, an appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s ruling by similarly citing to the expert’s credentials and
experience in pediatric medicine.92 The fourth opinion concerned DNA
The court
testing, which is statutorily admissible in Louisiana.93
acknowledged, however, that new advances in methods of using DNA may
raise reliability concerns, emphasized the importance of the trial judge’s
gatekeeping function concerning reliability, and remanded with an order that
the trial judge conduct a reliability hearing.94 The fifth and final opinion, in
82. State v. Cogar, No. 2017 KA 0426, 2017 WL 4082432, at *10–11 (La. Ct. App. Sept.
15, 2017) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
83. Id.
84. State v. Lee, 217 So. 3d 1266, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
85. Id. at 1272.
86. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7.
87. Lee, 217 So. 3d at 1272–75.
88. Id. at 1272–73.
89. Id. at 1276.
90. Id. at 1278.
91. State v. Haley, 222 So. 3d 153, 164–66 (La. Ct. App. 2017). While such a
technique, involving subjective experience-based judgments, may not have error-rate data
for the entire method, any such expert can be proficiency tested. See generally Garrett &
Mitchell, supra note 49.
92. Haley, 222 So. 3d at 164–66.
93. State v. Hampton, 183 So. 3d 769, 774, 779 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (citing LA. STAT.
ANN. § 15:441.1 (1989)).
94. Id. at 776–79.
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2014, found that IQ-test expert testimony was admissible because such
testimony was based on reliable principles and methods.95 Thus, none of the
above rulings denied admissibility. Only two of the five cases engaged in
any detailed discussion of the evidence concerning reliability of the method
proffered.
Written judicial rulings in favor of the defense were rare. We located
sixteen cases that reversed and found that the trial court erred in admitting
proffered prosecution expert evidence. Only three cases remanded for
additional consideration of admissibility. A Delaware ruling reversed
admissibility in a drug-testing case involving a field test to identify
marijuana.96 Two Indiana cases upheld the admission of expert testimony
related to marijuana. One found harmless error where the trial court admitted
the prosecution expert’s in-court identification of actual marijuana,97 while
the other found harmless error where the trial court excluded the defendant’s
evidence of a negative urinalysis.98 A Massachusetts case involving canine
narcotics-scent identification found the dog’s evidence inadmissible as expert
evidence.99
Several Michigan cases are also instructive. The court in one Michigan
case found that an expert interpreting homicide scene evidence should have
been excluded but that any error was harmless.100 Without assessing the
actual reliability of the expert, a second Michigan ruling found harmless error
as to expert testimony on the psychology of substance abuse.101 After the
Michigan Supreme Court vacated and remanded that ruling for further
review,102 the Michigan Court of Appeals found that the expert should have
been excluded but that the error was not outcome determinative and,
therefore, constituted harmless error.103 A third case from Michigan
excluded the prosecution’s expert testimony regarding linguistic analysis.104
A Mississippi case ruled that a prosecution witness, who would have
presented shooting-distance and trajectory measurements, should have been
excluded.105 A second Mississippi ruling rejected proffered testimony from
95. State v. Mullins, No. 14-260, 2014 WL 4926162, at *2 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014).
An additional ruling quoted from the state’s rule 702 but did not make any statement
concerning the reliability of the expert, although it noted the expert’s qualifications. See State
v. Farris, 210 So. 3d 877, 892 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
96. State v. Lucas, No. Cr.A. No.1503008254, 2015 WL 5157030, at *3–4 (Del. Ct. Com.
Pl. Sept. 2, 2015).
97. Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
98. Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
99. Commonwealth v. Corniel, No. 2004-0571, 2005 WL 1668448, at *8 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 23, 2005).
100. People v. Dixon-Bey, No. 331499, 2017 WL 4272135, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2017).
101. People v. Hamilton, No. 319980, 2016 WL 514288, at *6–7 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
2016), vacated, 889 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. 2017).
102. People v. Hamilton, 889 N.W.2d 508, 508–09 (Mich. 2017).
103. People v. Hamilton, No. 319980, 2017 WL 3316958, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1,
2017).
104. People v. Spitler, No. 331962, 2017 WL 2664729, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 20,
2017).
105. Parvin v. State, 113 So. 3d 1243, 1252 (Miss. 2013).
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a coroner who would have testified that the victim was in a “guarded
position” when killed.106 A North Carolina court found that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting blood-alcohol testing evidence due to its
lack of reliability.107
Three additional cases involved remands on appeal. A Louisiana case
regarding DNA evidence, as noted above, was remanded due to concerns
about the age of the samples and the procedures used.108 A West Virginia
ruling that predated its current Rule 702 analogue was remanded not for
reasons related to the admissibility of the testimony but rather to judicial
instructions bolstering the expert evidence.109 An Arizona case was similarly
remanded for additional inquiry into whether gas chromatography evidence
had been reliability applied to the facts of the case.110
Many of the cases that found prosecution expert evidence to be admissible
emphasized prior precedent as the reason for doing so; of the 229 cases, 41
chiefly relied on precedent in their reasoning.111 For example, an Arizona
appellate court emphasized that “our supreme court has sustained convictions
based solely on expert testimony about fingerprint or palm print evidence
because the evidence is sufficiently reliable.”112
As noted, we did not include in this analysis rulings that were more cursory
and that did not discuss reliability in any way. Many decisions did not even
mention reliability but simply cited to prior precedent. Some rulings quoted
to the state rule 702 but did not discuss reliability or the text of the rule. For
example, a Michigan case quoted to the state rule 702 and noted that the
police officer had used a “widely accepted” marijuana test, but the court
could not support the claim that the test was in fact widely accepted, explain
how it worked, or provide evidence of its accuracy.113 Without speaking to
reliability, the court said that the defendant did not do enough to affirmatively
challenge the evidence and dismissed the claim.114 Still other rulings did not
quote the state rule 702 but rather described reliability in a cursory way
without addressing that language. A Wisconsin court did just that when it
ruled on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim instead of a direct
evidentiary challenge.115 There, the court briefly noted that the trial court
conducted a Daubert hearing under the state evidentiary rule but without
quoting the language of that rule or discussing reliability under Daubert.116
The court stated that the fingerprint analyst in question had performed
106. Newell v. State, 176 So. 3d 78, 79 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
107. State v. Babich, 797 S.E.2d 359, 363 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
108. State v. Hampton, 183 So. 3d 769, 779 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
109. State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133, 147 (W. Va. 2002).
110. State v. Bernstein, 349 P.3d 200, 204–05 (Ariz. 2015).
111. As noted, we did not include cases solely relying on precedent in admitting the
evidence and not applying a state analogue to Rule 702. See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, No.
305965, 2012 WL 5290309, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012).
112. State v. Favela, 323 P.3d 716, 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
113. People v. Creager, No. 264417, 2007 WL 624529, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2007).
114. Id.
115. State v. Khalid, No. 2014AP251–CRNM, 2014AP252-CRNM, 2014 WL 12666820,
at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 2014).
116. Id.
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thousands of comparisons, had four years of training, and was certified, so
there was “no arguable basis for challenging the scientific validity of the
fingerprint analysis.”117 We did not include the opinion because it did not
quote or rely on a Rule 702 analogue.
Other courts emphasized that issues of reliability should be addressed at
trial through cross-examination, and not by judges assessing whether expert
evidence is minimally reliable.118 In doing so, they failed to conduct either
Rule 702 reliability assessments or more general Rule 403 assessments; they
instead adopted a laissez-faire approach toward the reliability of expert
evidence.
In addition to cases that discuss the qualifications of an expert but do not
discuss reliability, which we did not include, there were additional rulings
which did discuss reliability but concluded that the expert was reliable simply
because of the person’s background and experience. For example, a
Michigan court stated that an officer could testify about drug trafficking
operations because his “experience in investigating drug trafficking
operations” in that county was in itself “sufficient to establish the reliability
requirement.”119 Another case described the process followed by an expert
who showed the jurors images that he relied on and explained what
observations he made.120 The court then stated, in a cursory way, that this
process was itself sufficient to show reliable principles and methods—
leaving out any discussion of whether those principles and methods were in
fact reliable.121
In contrast, in a telling discussion, the Delaware Supreme Court
disregarded the lack of documentation in a firearms case.122 While the court
noted that it would have been better if the expert had been able to recall how
conclusions regarding ballistics had been reached in the case, the court still
found the evidence reliable citing the state rule 702 and the expert’s
qualification.123 The court also noting that in, cross-examination, the
defendant was “able to expose [the analyst’s] lack of recollection about the
application of the methodology to the facts here.”124
C. Defense Experts
Some state appellate decisions affirm the exclusion of expert evidence that
the defense sought to introduce. Critics have long complained that a different
standard applies when defendants, as opposed to prosecutors, seek to
introduce expert evidence. We observed more detailed discussions of
proffered defense expert evidence, and many of the small set of rulings
117.
118.
119.
120.
2007).
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See, e.g., Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1050–51 (Ind. 2011).
People v. Dado, No. 266962, 2007 WL 778489, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2007).
People v. Spencer, No. 271844, 2007 WL 4125378, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20,
Id.
McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364, 369 (Del. 2009).
Id.
Id.
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affirming exclusion of expert evidence were in that context. We note again
that excluding defense experts would be far more likely to result in an appeal.
While prosecutors may rarely have experts excluded, we cannot say so based
on the observed appellate opinions.
There were thirty-four such cases in our set that involved the trial exclusion
of defense expert evidence. An Arizona case excluded a defense expert
regarding causation of the victim’s injuries—largely on grounds of
qualification—but noted the lack of reliable data or methodology.125 One
Indiana case affirmed exclusion of a defense expert regarding a voice
comparison126 and another did so regarding a urinalysis.127 While another
Indiana case did the same regarding a breathalyzer test result, the court in that
instance declined to publish the opinion.128 A Kansas case affirmed the
exclusion of the testimony of a defendant’s breathalyzer expert.129 A
Massachusetts case affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s DNA expert,130
another affirmed the exclusion of a defense expert on false confessions,131
and a third related to a defense psychologist.132 Two Michigan cases
affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s testimony regarding the sources for
false confessions.133 Other rulings from Michigan include those related to
child sexual-abuse expertise,134 sex offender profiling,135 battered-womandefense-related testimony,136 eyewitness identification expert evidence,137
evidence on analyzing hair for drugs,138 and a defendant’s ballistics
evidence.139 In Mississippi, cases affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s
eyewitness identification expert,140 the exclusion of a defendant’s false
confessions expert,141 the exclusion of a defendant’s crime-scene

125. State v. Johnson, No. S1100 CR-201201686, 2013 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 401, at *3–5
(Dec. 17, 2013).
126. Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584, 595–96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
127. Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143–45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
128. Kryza v. State, No. 64A05-1305-CR-239, 2014 WL 345734, at *7–8 (Ind. Ct. App.
Jan. 30, 2014).
129. City of Topeka v. Lauck, No. 116,316, 2017 WL 4216191, at *6 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept.
22, 2017).
130. Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 25 N.E.3d 859, 872–73 (Mass. 2015).
131. Commonwealth v. Hoose, 5 N.E.3d 843, 863 (Mass. 2014).
132. Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495, 515 (Mass. 2016).
133. People v. Thames, No. 306313, 2013 WL 5663112, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17,
2013); People v. Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Mich. 2012).
134. People v. Piontek, No. 268048, 2007 WL 1227705, at *5–7 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 26,
2007); People v. Schneider, No. 273421, 2007 WL 1202322, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
2007).
135. People v. Steele, 769 N.W.2d 256, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Dobek, 732
N.W.2d 546, 570–71 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
136. People v. Sandoval-Ceron, No. 286985, 2010 WL 3021861, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 3, 2010).
137. People v. Buchanan, No. 275660, 2008 WL 681884, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2008).
138. People v. Farrsiar, No. 320376, 2015 WL 2329071, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. May 14,
2015).
139. People v. Payne, No. 248708, 2005 WL 433538, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005).
140. Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 298 (Miss. 2014).
141. Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787, 791 (Miss. 2007).
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reconstruction expert,142 the exclusion of a defendant’s DNA expert,143 the
exclusion of a defense eyewitness expert,144 and two cases involving the
exclusion of a proffered defense crime-scene investigations expert.145 Two
rulings in a North Carolina case affirmed the exclusion of a proffered expert
relevant to a self-defense claim and use of force.146 An Ohio case affirmed
the exclusion of a defense psychiatric witness,147 a second the exclusion of a
defense firearms witness,148 a third the exclusion of a defense witness on fish
size,149 and a fourth the exclusion of a defense expert chemically analyzing
soot,150 and a fifth a defense witness on biomechanics.151 A Utah case
affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s eyewitness-identification witness.152
A Vermont case affirmed exclusion of a defendant’s voice-print analysis
A Wisconsin case affirmed exclusion of a defendant’s
expert.153
chromatography expert.154
III. IMPLICATIONS
The sheer paucity of judicial opinions regarding expert evidence in
criminal cases is a real concern, apart from the quality of the opinions when
they do occur. One contributing factor to the lack of judicial rulings engaging
with the substance of the reliability rule is the deference to trial court rulings
in this area, the abuse of discretion review adopted by the Supreme Court in
General Electric, Co. v. Joiner,155 and the similar rules adopted by state
courts.
However, our findings regarding the quality of judicial decisions, and in
particular, the nonuse of the reliability elements of Rule 702, raise yet
additional reasons for concern. Few decisions discussed the meaning or
content of the reliability rules adopted in each jurisdiction. Even fewer
rulings discussed the Rule 702(d) prong regarding reliable application of
142. Grant v. State, 8 So. 3d 213, 218 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
143. Williams v. State, No. 2016-KA-00634-COA, 2017 WL 3601170, at *8 (Miss. Ct.
App. Aug. 22, 2017).
144. Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, ¶¶ 33–38 (Miss. 2014), rev’d on other grounds,
136 S. Ct. 2157 (2016).
145. Powers v. State, 945 So. 2d 386, ¶¶ 11–13 (Miss. 2006) (en banc); Ross v. State, 22
So. 3d 400, 420–21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
146. State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1, 15 (N.C. 2016); State v. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d 361,
367–370 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2016).
147. State v. Ream, No. 1-12-39, 2013 WL 5447606, at *20–22 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
2013).
148. State v. Wegmann, No. 1-06-98, 2008 WL 434981, at *12–13 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19,
2008).
149. State v. Whites Landing Fisheries, LLC, No. E-16-040, 2017 WL 3981167, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2017).
150. State v. Wangler, No. 1-11-18, 2012 WL 5207546, at *14–19 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22,
2017).
151. State v. Calise, No. 26027, 2012 WL 4897840, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012).
152. State v. Guard, 371 P.3d 1, 2–3 (Utah 2015).
153. State v. Forty, 989 A.2d 509, 519 (Vt. 2009).
154. State v. Garba, No. 2015AP1243-CR, 2016 WL 5794346, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5,
2016).
155. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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methods and principles to the facts of a case. We identified 30 of the 229
rulings that did so.
Proposals to sharpen the language regarding reliability in Rule 702, or to
adopt a separate reliability rule for forensic identification evidence, might
help to address this concern by making the reliability language more salient.
Such a proposal might be accompanied by Advisory Committee notes that
highlight the importance of addressing error and reliability of expert methods
and their application in particular cases. Our findings highlight how the
existing reliability language is largely ignored by judges who continue to rely
on precedent, the credentials and experience of a proffered expert, and other
traditional factors.
New research findings, reports from scientific bodies, and changes in the
law have had little impact on this analysis. Very few rulings cited to the 2009
NRC report156 or the 2016 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology.157 One Louisiana ruling did cite the reports but did
not rely on them.158 Instead, the court based the decision on prior rulings in
other courts and affirmed the prosecution’s use of firearms testimony.159 A
Michigan ruling noted the defense’s reliance on the NRC report but
nonetheless found the relevant DNA testing to be reliable.160 An Ohio case
cited to the NRC report regarding firearms, but, rather than rely on it, found
the experts’ methods to be generally accepted.161 Finally, a Utah case noted
the defense’s citation to the NRC report’s challenge of the reliability of
fingerprint evidence but found the expert evidence admissible nonetheless.162
Another approach to improving the consideration of expert reliability is to
focus on the courtroom and, specifically, to permit careful questioning of
experts on studies of error rates, the expert’s own proficiency, and reliability
in application of the method. Doing so may require far more discovery than
judges often provide in criminal cases concerning the work that an expert
actually does in a criminal case.163 Doing so may also require regulation to
assure that demanding and realistic proficiency testing is actually performed
in crime laboratories. One of us has advocated for the use of proficiency
testing first to assess expert qualification and again at trial to determine and
demonstrate an expert’s own accuracy. Such information appears to be
highly probative to jurors.164
Scholars and scientific bodies have for years recommended that forensic
evidence be regulated by a scientific entity at the national level, but no such
156. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7.
157. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 12.
158. State v. Lee, 217 So. 3d 1266, 1272 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
159. Id. at 1275–76.
160. People v. Jackson, No. 313455, 2014 WL 3973378, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14,
2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, 870 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 2015).
161. State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936, 944–46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
162. State v. Woodard, 330 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
163. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., Recommendations to the Attorney General Regarding
Pretrial Discovery, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
ncfs/page/file/865011/download [https://perma.cc/G5VH-8LCA].
164. See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 49, at 42–43.
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national entity has been created to date, and state- and federal-level efforts to
improve standards for forensic evidence have been halting.165 To the extent,
then, that the problem rests on the shoulders of judges, chiefly state judges,
far more must be done to introduce reliability into the reliability test that
judges ostensibly apply to review expert testimony in criminal cases.
CONCLUSION
Reliability should be central to the task of judicial examination of expert
evidence before trial and it should inform how expert evidence is litigated
and presented during trial. The modern Rule 702 was drafted to emphasize
the concept of reliability both as to methods used by experts and their
application to the facts of a case. The concept of reliability is particularly
important in the expert-evidence context because expert testimony may be
given great weight by jurors and because experts can form opinions and reach
conclusions that lay witnesses cannot.
District of Columbia Superior Court Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. explains,
“Foundational validity for forensic science requires reliability. It must be
based on empirical studies, repeatable, reproducible, and accurate at
appropriate levels—a scientific concept intended to correspond to the legal
requirement in Rule 702(c) of ‘reliable principles and methods.’”166 Despite
the centrality of reliability to the use of expert evidence, as we describe, state
and federal courts have largely avoided the subject of reliability in criminal
cases. The reliability test adopted in Rule 702 appears, at least in written
appellate opinions, to be rarely used in practice to test reliability and, when
used, it tends to exclude defense witnesses.
The clear language of the modern Rule 702 calls for a twin analysis of
expert reliability, but we observed an entrenched judicial unwillingness to
review expert evidence at all in criminal cases, much less to assess reliability
and restrict expert testimony that is unreliable. Errors, including wrongful
convictions, predictably result from this lax attitude toward judicial
gatekeeping. Several types of judicial interventions as well as regulatory
interventions could improve this state of affairs. We conclude, however, that
judges in most states already have a reliability test that they can and should
use. The reliability of judgments in criminal cases, in which life and liberty
is at stake, depends on the sound judicial use of the reliability test.

165. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 14–21.
166. Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Another Harsh Spotlight on Forensic Sciences, JUDGES’
J., Winter 2017, at 36, 37.
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Appendix I: Expert Reliability Rulings

Case Citation

Ruling

Evidence Type

Δ or Π
Expert

Payne v. State, CR-15-0225, 2017 WL
543151 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2017)

Admit

Medical examination

Π

State v. Bernstein, 317 P.3d 630 (Ariz.
AZ Ct. App. 2014), vacated in part, 349 P.3d
200 (Ariz. 2015)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

State v. Brown, No. 2 CA-CR 2015AZ 0154, 2016 WL 4256875 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2016)

Admit

Shaken baby
syndrome

Π

Admit

Child abuse

Π

Admit

Drugs

Π

Admit

Automobile
computer-generated
crash data

Π

Admit

Shoe prints, bike-tire
tracks

Π

AL

AZ

State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 312 P.3d 123
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)

State v. Chacon, No. 2 CA-CR 2014AZ 0150, 2015 WL 3536584 (Ariz. Ct. App.
May 28, 2015)
State v. Clary, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0694,
AZ 2016 WL 4525041 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug.
30, 2016)
State v. Democker, No. 1 CA-CR 14AZ 0137, 2016 WL 5899733 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Oct. 11, 2016)
AZ

State v. Favela, 323 P.3d 716 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2014)

Admit

Fingerprint

Π

AZ

State v. Foshay, 370 P.3d 618 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2016)

Admit

3D ballistics
imaging, firearms

Π

State v. Foshee, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0249,
Blood alcohol
AZ 2014 WL 346110 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 30, Admit
content
2014)
State v. Harold, No. 2 CA-CR 2012Toxicology,
AZ 0316, 2014 WL 632280 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Admit
urinalysis
Feb. 14, 2014)
State v. Johnson, No. S1100 CRAZ 201201686, 2013 Ariz. Super. LEXIS
Exclude
Causation
401 (Dec. 17, 2013)
State v. Moore, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0589,
AZ 2017 WL 56267 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 5,
Admit Sexual assault victim
2017)

Π

Π

Δ

Π
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AZ

State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 321
P.3d 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

AZ

State v. Romero, 365 P.3d 358 (Ariz.
2016)

Admit

Firearms

Π

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

Admit

Paper matching,
handwriting

Π

Admit

Child abuse

Π

Admit

Trace hair,
toolmarks,
fingerprint, footwear,
handwriting

Π

DE Id.

Exclude

Voice identification,
handwriting

Π

State v. Lucas, No. Cr.A. No.
DE 1503008254, 2015 WL 5157030 (Del.
Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 2, 2015)

Exclude

Drug identification

Π

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 304 P.3d 543
AZ (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 325 P.3d
996 (Ariz. 2014)
State v. Saunders, No. 1 CA-CR 15AZ 0416, 2016 WL 3264105 (Ariz. Ct. App.
June 14, 2016)
State v. Stephen, No. CR-2009-4604AZ 001, 2012 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 871 (Feb.
1, 2012)
State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d 1078 (Del.
DE
Super. Ct. 2007)

DE

McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364 (Del.
2009)

Admit

Firearms

Π

DE

State v. Salasky, 2013 WL 5487363 (Del.
Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2013)

Admit

Medical toxicology,
psychiatry

Π

FL

Andrews v. State, 181 So. 3d 526 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

Admit

Psychiatry

Π

IN

Alcantar v. State, 70 N.E.3d 353 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016)

Admit

DNA

Π

IN

Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. Ct.
Exclude
App. 2014)

Urinalysis

Δ

IN

Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010)

Admit

Fingerprint

Π

IN

Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004)

Admit

Fingerprint

Π
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IN

Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215 (Ind.
2009)

Admit

Blood spatter

Π

IN

Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377 (Ind.
2002)

Admit

Bite mark

Π

IN

Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct.
Exclude
App. 2012)

THC

Π

IN

Evans v. State, No. 79A04-1308-CR386, 2014 WL 1775728 (Ind. Ct. App.
May 1, 2014)

Admit

Chemicals
(ammonia)

Π

IN

Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002)

Exclude

Voice analysis

Δ

Exclude

Breathalyzer

Δ

Admit

Causation

Π

IN

IN

Kryza v. State, No. 64A05-1305-CR239, 2014 WL 345734 (Ind. Ct. App.
Jan. 30, 2014)
Lee v. State, No. 71A03-1301-CR-5,
2013 WL 2718079 (Ind. Ct. App. June
12, 2013)

IN

Mogg v. State, 918 N.E.2d 750 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009)

Admit

Secure continuous
remote alcohol
monitor system

Π

IN

Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000)

Admit

DNA

Π

IN

Prewitt v. State, 819 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004)

Admit

Causation

Π

IN

Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811 (Ind.
2002)

Admit

DNA

Π

IN

Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind.
2011)

Admit

Firearms, toolmark

Π

IN

Sciaraffa v. State, 28 N.E.3d 351 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015)

Admit

Drugs

Π

IN

West v. State, 805 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004)

Exclude

Fire extinguisher

Π

City of Topeka v. Lauck, No. 116,316,
KS 2017 WL 4216191 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept.
22, 2017)

Exclude

Breathalyzer

Δ
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KY

Epperson v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.3d
157 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014)

Admit

Toxicology

Π

KY

Futrell v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d
258 (Ky. 2015)

Admit

Child abuse

Π

KY

Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 525
S.W.3d 73 (Ky. 2017)

Admit

Cell site location
information

Π

Admit

Medical examination

Π

State v. Cogar, No. 2017 KA 0426, 2017
LA WL 4082432 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2017)
LA

State v. Haley, 222 So. 3d 153 (La. Ct.
App. 2017)

Admit

Pediatric age
assignment from
photographs

Π

LA

State v. Hampton, 183 So. 3d 769 (La.
Ct. App. 2015)

Remand

DNA

Π

LA

State v. Lee, 217 So. 3d 1266 (La. Ct.
App. 2017)

Admit

Ballistics

Π

LA

State v. Mullins, No. 14-260, 2014 WL
4926162 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014)

Admit

IQ test

Π

Commonwealth v. Corniel, No. 2004MA 0571, 2005 WL 1668448 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 23, 2005)

Exclude

Drug odor (cocaine)

Π

MA

Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 25 N.E.3d
859 (Mass. 2015)

Exclude

DNA analysis

Δ

MA

Commonwealth v. Hoose, 5 N.E.3d 843
(Mass. 2014)

Exclude

False confessions

Δ

Commonwealth v. Meeks, Nos. 2002MA 10961, 2003-10575, 2006 WL 2819423
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2006)

Admit

Ballistics

Π

MA

Commonwealth v. Shanley, 919 N.E.2d
1254 (Mass. 2010)

Admit

Dissociative
amnesia, recovered
memory

Π

MA

Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d
Exclude*
495 (Mass. 2016)

Psychology

Δ

MD

Savage v. State, 166 A.3d 183 (Md.
2017)

Neuropsychological
effect of brain tumor

Δ

Exclude
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People v. Altman, No. 267592, 2007 WL
MI 2609448 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2007) Admit
Causation
(per curiam)
People v. Anderson, No. 331466, 2017
MI WL 4699734 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 19,
Exclude
Cell phone
2017) (per curiam)
People v. Bailey, No. 285638, 2009 WL
MI 3323252 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2009)
Admit
Sexual abuse
(per curiam)
People v. Barnard, No. 265068, 2007
MI WL 1159977 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 19,
Admit
Forensic interview
2007) (per curiam)
People v. Bowne, No. 316283, 2014 WL
MI 5364076 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2014)
Admit
Child sexual abuse
(per curiam)
People v. Brown, No. 325115, 2016 WL
Cell site location
MI 555928 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2016)
Admit
information
(per curiam)
People v. Brown, No. 323887, 2016 WL
Gunshot residue, cell
MI 2731069 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2016) Admit
site location
(per curiam)
information
People v. Buchanan, No. 275660, 2008
Eyewitness
MI WL 681884 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 13,
Exclude
identification
2008) (per curiam)
People v. Burns, No. 327179, 2016 WL
Injuries diagnostic to
MI 6495853 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016)
Admit
abuse
(per curiam)
People v. Caldwell, No. 318915, 2015
Delayed disclosures
MI WL 558322 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
Admit
in child abuse
2015) (per curiam)
People v. Carpenter, No. 302231, 2012
MI WL 933615 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20,
Admit
Domestic abuse
2012) (per curiam)
People v. Carter, No. 318511, 2015 WL
MI 302693 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2015)
Admit
Fire causation
(per curiam)
People v. Ceasor, No. 268150, 2007 WL
Shaken baby
MI 2011747 (Mich. Ct. App. July 12, 2007)
Admit
syndrome
(per curiam)
People v. Dado, No. 266962, 2007 WL
Characterizing drug
MI 778489 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2007)
Admit
sales
(per curiam)
People v. Daniel, Nos. 308230, 308231,
Shooting
MI 308575, 2014 WL 3844010 (Mich. Ct.
Admit
reconstruction
App. Aug. 5, 2014) (per curiam)

[Vol. 86
Π

Π

Π

Π

Π

Π

Π

Δ

Π

Π

Π

Π

Π

Π

Π
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People v. Dixon-Bey, No. 331499, 2017
MI WL 4272135 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2017)

Exclude

Homicide scene
interpretation

Π

People v. Dobek, 732 N.W.2d 546
(Mich. Ct. App. 2007)

Exclude

Psychological
profiling of sex
offenders

Δ

Causation

Π

Sexual abuse

Π

Hair drug testing

Δ

Blood spatter

Π

Cell site location
information

Π

Handwriting

Π

Psychology of
substance abuse and
addiction

Π

Cell site location
information

Π

Surveillance footage

Π

Cell site location
information

Π

DNA

Π

Causation

Π

MI

People v. Farraj, No. 264235, 2007 WL
MI 861100 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2007)
Admit
(per curiam)
People v. Fathi, No. 288330, 2010 WL
MI 2836275 (Mich. Ct. App. July 20, 2010)
Admit
(per curiam)
People v. Farrsiar, No. 320376, 2015 WL
MI 2329071 (Mich. Ct. App. May 14, 2015) Exclude
(per curiam)
People v. Fawaz, No. 264703, 2007 WL
MI 861104 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2007)
Admit
(per curiam)
People v. Garten, No. 323670, 2016 WL
555834 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2016)
Admit
MI
(per curiam), perm. app. denied, 886
N.W.2d 433 (Mich. 2016)
People v. Graham, No. 263702, 2007
MI WL 861173 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22,
Admit
2007) (per curiam)
People v. Hamilton, No. 319980, 2017
MI WL 3316958 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1,
Exclude
2017) (per curiam)
People v. Hammock, No. 277672, 2008
MI WL 4330176 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 23,
Admit
2008) (per curiam)
People v. Harvey, Nos. 319482, 319483,
MI 2015 WL 8953522 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. Admit
15, 2015) (per curiam)
People v. Hill, No. 326550, 2016 WL
3365256 (Mich. Ct. App. June 16, 2016)
Admit
MI
(per curiam), perm. app. denied, 887
N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 2016)
People v. Jackson, No. 313455, 2014 WL
3973378 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2014)
Admit
MI
(per curiam), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 870 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 2015)
People v. James, No. 301526, 2012 WL
MI 75355 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012)
(per curiam)

Admit
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People v. Johnson, No. 324567, 2016
MI WL 2342284 (Mich. Ct. App. May 3,
2016) (per curiam)
People v. Kircher, No. 275215, 2008 WL
MI 3540254 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2008)
(per curiam)
MI

People v. Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 14
(Mich. 2012)

MI Id.
People v. Lawson, No. 302128, 2012 WL
MI 2402033 (Mich. Ct. App. June 26, 2012)
(per curiam)
MI
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People v. Lane, 862 N.W.2d 446 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam)

People v. Lay, No. 330880, 2017 WL
MI 3276845 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017)
(per curiam)
People v. McDaniel, No. 290689, 2010
MI WL 3813347 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 30,
2010) (per curiam)
People v. Payne, No. 248708, 2005 WL
MI 433538 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005)
(per curiam)
People v. Perrien, Nos. 312743, 317405,
MI 2015 WL 7283216 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.
17, 2015) (per curiam)
People v. Piontek, No. 268048, 2007 WL
MI 1227705 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2007)
(per curiam)
People v. Pritchett, No. 329901, 2017
WL 1422830 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 20,
MI
2017) (per curiam), perm. app. denied,
903 N.W.2d 581 (Mich. 2017)
People v. Pruitt, No. 313065, 2014 WL
MI 1320253 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2014)
(per curiam)
People v. Sandoval-Ceron, No. 286985,
MI 2010 WL 3021861 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
3, 2010) (per curiam)
People v. Schneider, No. 273421, 2007
MI WL 1202322 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
2007) (per curiam)

Admit

Cell site location
information

Π

Admit

Raw sewage hazards

Π

Exclude

False confessions

Δ

Remand

Clinical psychology

Δ

Admit

Identification based
on ear characteristics

Π

Admit

Cadaver dog
evidence

Π

Admit

Forensic cell phone
analysis

Π

Admit

Motorcycle-make
identification

Π

Exclude

Firearms

Δ

Admit

Cell site location
information

Π

Exclude

Child sexual abuse

Δ

Admit

Ballistics

Π

Admit

Fire causation

Π

Exclude

Battered woman
syndrome

Δ

Exclude

Profile of a child
molester

Δ
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People v. Spencer, No. 271844, 2007
MI WL 4125378 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20,
2007) (per curiam)
People v. Spitler, No. 331962, 2017 WL
2664729 (Mich. Ct. App. June 20, 2017)
MI (per curiam), remanded on other
grounds, No. 156281, 2018 WL 561367
(Mich. 2018)
MI

Admit

Fire causation

Π

Exclude

Linguistic analysis

Π

Sex offender
identification

Δ

Toxicology

Π

Eyewitness
identification

Δ

Pediatric age
assignment

Π

Child abuse

Π

Height comparison
using photos

Π

False confessions,
psychology

Δ

Cell site location
information

Π

Posttraumatic stress
disorder

Π

Admit

Medical examination

Π

Admit

Cell site location
information

Π

Admit

DNA

Π

People v. Steele, 769 N.W.2d 256 (Mich.
Exclude
Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam)

People v. Stiehl, No. 283641, 2009 WL
MI 2951284 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009) Admit
(per curiam)
People v. Stroud, Nos. 322812, 322879
2016 WL 901333 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar.
Exclude
MI
8, 2016) (per curiam), perm. app. denied,
885 N.W.2d 286 (Mich. 2016)
People v. Stumpmier, No. 330145, 2017
WL 1488966 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 25,
Admit
MI
2017) (per curiam), rev’d on other
grounds, 903 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. 2017)
People v. Sweeney, No. 330662, 2017
MI WL 2562562 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13,
Admit
2017) (per curiam)
People v. Sutton, No. 275447, 2008 WL
MI 2627607 (Mich. Ct. App. July 3, 2008)
Admit
(per curiam)
People v. Thames, No. 306313, 2013 WL
MI 5663112 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2013) Exclude
(per curiam)
People v. Thomas, No. 326645, 2016
MI WL 3421403 (Mich. Ct. App. June 21,
Admit
2016) (per curiam)
People v. Traxler, No. 314951, 2014 WL
MI 2934293 (Mich. Ct. App. June 26, 2014) Admit
(per curiam)
MI

People v. Unger, 749 N.W.2d 272 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2008)

People v. West, No. 317109, 2014 WL
MI 7157390 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2014)
(per curiam)
People v. Wood, 862 N.W.2d 7 (Mich.
MI Ct. App. 2014), vacated in part on other
grounds, 871 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 2015)
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People v. Wright, No. 261380, 2006 WL
MI 2271264 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006)
(per curiam)
People v. Wyngarden, No. 321736, 2015
MI WL 4746277 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 11,
2015) (per curiam)

Admit

Blood detection
chemicals

Π

Admit

Interrogation
techniques, false
confessions

Δ

MS

Anderson v. State, 62 So. 3d 927 (Miss.
2011)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

MS

Bateman v. State, 125 So. 3d 616 (Miss.
2013)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

MS

Brown v. State, 33 So. 3d 1134 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2009)

Admit

Forensic pathology

Π

MS

Carter v. State, 996 So. 2d 112 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

MS

Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278
(Miss. 2014)

Exclude

Eyewitness
identification

Δ

Daniels v. State, No. 2016-KA-00501MS COA, 2017 WL 3485858 (Miss. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2017)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

Exclude

False confessions

Δ

Exclude

Forensic pathology

Π

MS

Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss.
2007)

MS Id.

MS

Evans v. State, 25 So. 3d 1061 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Δ

MS

Flaggs v. State, 999 So. 2d 393 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008)

Admit

Blood spatter

Π

Criminal
investigation
procedures,
eyewitness
identification

Δ

Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009 (Miss.
MS 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. Exclude
2157 (2016)

MS

Fulgham v. State, 46 So. 3d 315 (Miss.
2010)

Admit

Social
characterization

Δ

MS

Gillett v. State, 56 So. 3d 469 (Miss.
2010)

Admit

DNA

Π
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MS

Grant v. State, 8 So. 3d 213 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008)

MS

1591

Exclude

Evidence gathering

Δ

Gray v. State, 202 So. 3d 243 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2015)

Admit

Victim survival after
fatal injuries

Π

MS

Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781 (Miss.
2003)

Admit

Bite mark

Π

MS

Hull v. State, 174 So. 3d 887 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2015)

Admit

Forensic pathology

Π

MS

Jane v. State, 222 So. 3d 1088 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2017)

Admit

Automobile accident
reconstruction

Π

MS

Lattimer v. State, 952 So. 2d 206 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

MS Lima v. State, 7 So. 3d 903 (Miss. 2009)

Admit

Forensic pathology

Π

Lowe v. State, 178 So. 3d 760 (Miss. Ct.
MS App. 2012), rev’d, 127 So. 3d 178 (Miss.
2013)

Admit

Computer forensics

Π

MS

Madden v. State, 97 So. 3d 1217 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2011)

Admit

Child sexual abuse

Π

MS

McClain v. State, 929 So. 2d 946 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2005)

Admit

Toolmark, footprint

Π

MS

Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073 (Miss.
2010)

Admit

Causation

Π

MS

Mooneyham v. State, 915 So. 2d 1102
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

MS

Newell v. State, 176 So. 3d 78 (Miss. Ct.
Exclude
App. 2014)

Forensic pathology

Π

MS

Parvin v. State, 113 So. 3d 1243 (Miss.
2013)

Exclude

Ballistics

Π

MS

Pickett v. State, 143 So. 3d 596 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2013)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π
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Powell v. State, NO. 2016-KA-00518MS COA, 2017 WL 3712862 (Miss. Ct. App.
Aug. 29, 2017)

Admit

Forensic interview

Π

MS

Powers v. State, 945 So. 2d 386 (Miss.
2006) (en banc)

MS

Ross v. State, 22 So. 3d 400 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2009)

Admit

Pathology

Δ

MS

State v. Scott, No. 2014-KA-00123-SCT,
2017 WL 2377563 (Miss. June 1, 2017)

Admit

Psychiatry

Δ

MS

Smith v. State, 942 So. 2d 308 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

MS

Taylor v. State, 954 So. 2d 944 (Miss.
2007)

Admit

Burn patterns

Π

MS

Teston v. State, 44 So. 3d 977 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008)

Admit

Toxicology,
pharmacology

Π

MS

Warren v. State, 187 So. 3d 616 (Miss.
2016)

Admit

Drugs

Π

DNA

Δ

Admit

Ballistics

Π

Exclude

Fingerprints

Π

Exclude* Crime scene analysis

Williams v. State, No. 2016-KA-00634MS COA, 2017 WL 3601170 (Miss. Ct. App. Exclude
Aug. 22, 2017)
MS

Willie v. State, 204 So. 3d 1268 (Miss.
2016)

NH State v. Langill, 945 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2008)

Δ

NH

State v. Staples, No. 2006-0681, 2008
WL 11258731 (N.H. Jan. 30, 2008)

Admit

Accounting

Π

NC

State v. Abrams, 789 S.E.2d 863 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2016)

Admit

Drugs

Π

NC

State v. Babich, 797 S.E.2d 359 (N.C. Ct.
Exclude
App. 2017)

Blood alcohol
content

Π

NC

State v. Daughtridge, 789 S.E.2d 667
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016)

Causation

Π

Exclude
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State v. Frye, No. COA16-362, 2016 WL
6440555 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016)

Admit

Drugs

Π

State v. Greene, No. COA16-1309, 2017
NC WL 4127730 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 19,
2017)

Admit

Horizontal gaze
nystagmus

Π

NC

NC

State v. Hunt, 790 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016)

Admit

Drugs

Π

NC

State v. McDonald, 716 S.E.2d 250 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2011)

Admit

Drugs

Π

NC

State v. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d 361 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2014)

Exclude

Use of force

Δ

NC

State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C.
2016)

Exclude

Reaction times

Δ

NC

State v. Perry, 750 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013)

Admit

Child abuse

Π

NC

State v. Quick, No. COA13-289, 2014
WL 46996 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2014)

Admit

Drugs

Π

NC

State v. Shore, 803 S.E.2d 606 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2017)

Admit

Child abuse

Π

NC

State v. Turbyfill, 776 S.E.2d 249 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2015)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content, horizontal
gaze nystagmus

Π

NC

State v. Younts, 803 S.E.2d 641 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2017)

Admit

Horizontal gaze
nystagmus

Π

Admit

Ballistics, toolmarks

Π

State v. Armstrong, Nos. 2001-T-0120,
OH 2002-T-0071, 2004 WL 2376467 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2004)
OH

State v. Bell, No. 06-MA-189, 2008 WL
3009858 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25, 2008)

Admit

DNA

Π

OH

State v. Blamer, No. 00CA07, 2001 WL
109130 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2001)

Admit

Bite marks

Π

OH

State v. Calise, No. 26027, 2012 WL
4897840 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012)

Exclude

Brain injury
causation

Δ
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State v. Graham, No. 3052-M, 2001 WL
22482 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2001)

OH Id.

Admit

Hair comparison

Π

Exclude

Hair attribution to
particular defendant

Π

OH

State v. Henderson, No. 13 CR 135, 2017
WL 462596 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017)

Admit

Medical examination

Π

OH

State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2013)

Admit

Ballistics

Π

Admit

Fire characteristics

Π

Admit

Drugs

Π

Admit

Forensic pathology

Π

Admit

Forensic
pharmacology

Π

State v. Marshall, No. 06CA23, 2007
OH WL 4180806 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 16,
2007)
State v. McDade, Nos. OT-06-001, OTOH 06-004, 2007 WL 549498 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 23, 2007)
State v. Mills, No. 2007 AP 07 0039,
OH 2009 WL 1041441 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.
15, 2009)
State v. Mobarak, No. 14AP-517, 2017
OH WL 4334156 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2017)
OH

State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio
1998)

Admit

Battered child
syndrome

Δ

OH

State v. Onunwor, No. 93937, 2010 WL
4684717 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010)

Admit

Firearms

Π

OH

State v. Plott, 80 N.E.3d 1108 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2017)

Admit

Forensic pathology

Π

OH

State v. Ream, No. 1-12-39, 2013 WL
5447606 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2013)

Exclude

Psychiatry

Δ

OH

State v. Shalash, 41 N.E.3d 1263 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2015)

Admit

Drug analogues

Π

OH

State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. 2007)

Admit

Polygraph

Δ

OH

State v. Thompson, No. 89391, 2008 WL
248767 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008)

Admit

Fire causation

Π
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Admit

Chemical analysis of
soot

Π

Exclude

Chemical analysis of
soot

Δ

Exclude

Bullet wound

Δ

Exclude

Fish shrinkage

Δ

State v. Williams, 703 N.E.2d 1284
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1998)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

Bosse v. State, 400 P.3d 834 (Crim. App.
OK Okla. 2017), aff’d, 406 P.3d 26 (Crim.
App. Okla. 2017)

Admit

Fire reconstruction

Π

OK

Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906 (Crim.
App. Okla. 2016)

Admit

Automobile accident
reconstruction

Π

OK

Day v. State, 303 P.3d 291 (Crim. App.
Okla. 2013)

Admit

Shaken baby
syndrome

Π

SD

State v. Johnson, 860 N.W.2d 235 (S.D.
2015)

Admit

Child sexual abuse

Π

SD

State v. Yuel, 840 N.W.2d 680 (S.D.
2013)

Admit

Horizontal gaze
nystagmus

Π

UT

State v. Clopten, 362 P.3d 1216 (Utah
2015)

Admit

Eyewitness
identification

Π

UT

State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103 (Utah
2009)

Admit

Eyewitness
identification

Δ

UT

State v. Griffin, 384 P.3d 186 (Utah
2016)

Admit

DNA

Π

Exclude

Eyewitness
identification

Δ

Admit

DNA

Π

OH

State v. Wangler, No. 1-11-18, 2012 WL
5207546 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2012)

OH Id.
State v. Wegmann, No. 1-06-98, 2008
OH WL 434981 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19,
2008)
State v. Whites Landing Fisheries, LLC,
OH No. E-16-040, 2017 WL 3981167 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2017)
OH

UT State v. Guard, 371 P.3d 1 (Utah 2015)

UT

State v. Jones, 345 P.3d 1195 (Utah
2015)
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UT

State v. Lievanos, 298 P.3d 662 (Utah Ct.
App. 2013)

Admit

DNA

Π

UT

State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah
2012)

Admit

DNA, fingerprints

Π

Admit

False confessions

Δ

UT State v. Perea, 322 P.3d 624 (Utah 2013)

UT

State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226 (Utah
2015)

Admit

Computer forensics

Π

UT

State v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417 (Utah Ct.
App. 2012)

Admit

Palm print

Π

Remand

Palm print

Δ

UT Id.

UT

State v. Shepherd, 357 P.3d 598 (Utah
Ct. App. 2015)

Admit

Boat operation

Π

UT

State v. Turner, 283 P.3d 527 (Utah Ct.
App. 2012)

Admit

Breathalyzer

Π

UT

State v. Woodard, 330 P.3d 1283 (Utah
Ct. App. 2014)

Admit

Fingerprints

Π

VT

State v. Abair, No. 2011-089, 2012 WL
1293562 (Vt. Mar. 15, 2012)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

VT

State v. Brochu, 949 A.2d 1035 (Vt.
2008)

Admit

Hair comparison,
DNA

Π

VT State v. Forty, 989 A.2d 509 (Vt. 2009)

Exclude

Voice identification

Δ

VT State v. Pratt, 128 A.3d 883 (Vt. 2015)

Admit

Forensic cell phone
analysis

Π

VT State v. Scott, 88 A.3d 1173 (Vt. 2013)

Admit

Automobile accident
reconstruction

Π

Admit

Blood alcohol
content, causation

Π

VT

State v. Sullivan, 167 A.3d 876 (Vt.
2017)
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VT State v. Tester, 968 A.2d 895 (Vt. 2009)
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Admit

DNA

Π

WV

State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va.
2002)

Admit

Sexual abuse and
STD testing

Π

WV

State v. Wakefield, 781 S.E.2d 222 (W.
Va. 2015)

Admit

Drugs

Π

State v. Alvarez, No. 2014AP753-CR,
WI 2015 WL 158899 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 14,
2015) (per curiam)

Admit

Marijuana
distribution

Π

State v. Chitwood, 879 N.W.2d 786
(Wis. Ct. App. 2016)

Admit

Drug recognition
evaluation

Π

Blood alcohol
content

Π

Drug quantities

Π

Blood alcohol
content

Δ

WI

State v. Chough, No. 2016AP406-CR,
WI 2017 WL 389856 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 25, Admit
2017)
State v. Evans, No. 2015AP2315-CR,
WI 2016 WL 5922863 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.
Admit
12, 2016)
State v. Garba, No. 2015AP1243-CR,
WI 2016 WL 5794346 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, Exclude
2016)
State v. Giese, 854 N.W.2d 687 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2014)

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

State v. Johnson, No. 2013AP65-CR,
WI 2013 WL 12185148 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.
11, 2013)

Admit

Sexual assault

Π

Admit

Child sexual assault

Π

Admit

Blood alcohol
content

Π

Admit

Horizontal gaze
nystagmus

Π

Admit

Sexual assault

Π

WI

WI

State v. Smith, 874 N.W.2d 610 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2015)

State v. Spizzirri, No. 2015AP84-CR,
WI 2015 WL 9309202 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2015) (per curiam)
State v. VanMeter, No. 2014AP1852WI CR, 2015 WL 7432604 (Wis. Ct. App.
Nov. 24, 2015)
State v. Zamora, No. 2016AP1923-CR,
WI 2017 WL 4317783 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept.
27, 2017)

*

* The court held that the expert testimony should have been excluded but that the defendant’s
attorney’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Appendix II: State Rule 702 Adoption
and Usage in Criminal Cases
State

Alabama167
Arizona
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Indiana168
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts169
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Ohio170

Year Adopted
2012
2012
2001
2013
2013
1994
2014
2007
2014
n/a
1993
2004
2003
2017
2016
2011
1994

Cases Discussing
Reliability
1
17
4
1
0
18
1
3
5
6
1
59
37
0
2
14
22

167. The Alabama rule has the same reliability language but a slightly different structure
(as well as additional provisions regarding juvenile cases, medical testimony, and use of DNA
evidence). ALA. R. EVID. 702. Regarding expert evidence generally, the rule states:
(b) In addition to the requirements in section (a), expert testimony based on a
scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only if:
(1) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
Id.
168. IND. R. EVID. 702(b) (requiring that the expert testimony “rests upon reliable scientific
principles”). The Rule included a reliability prong upon its adoption in 1994. A 2014 revision
edited the structure, but the text of the reliability prong remained the same.
169. Massachusetts does not have official rules of evidence, but the Supreme Judicial Court
recommends the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Press Release, Mass.gov, 2017 Edition of
the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence Now Available (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.mass.gov/news/2017-edition-of-the-massachusetts-guide-to-evidence-nowavailable [https://perma.cc/7JZG-G8YY]; see also Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d
1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (adopting the Daubert rationale).
170. Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 varies significantly from the federal rule, providing:
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other
specialized information. To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a

2018]
Oklahoma171
South Dakota
Utah172
Vermont
West Virginia
Wisconsin
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2013
2011
2007
2004
2014
2011

3
2
13
7
2
11

procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following
apply:
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is
objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge,
facts, or principles;
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably implements the
theory;
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will
yield an accurate result.
OHIO R. EVID. 702.
171. The Oklahoma rule provides, using the same language as the federal rule, “(1) The
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) The testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2702 (West 2017).
172. Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods
that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
UTAH R. EVID. 702.

